Ethics in Land Use Practice: Guiding Principles for Attorneys and Land Use Board Members

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HOW TO ANALYZE AN ETHICS PROBLEM:
NY GEN. MUN. LAW ART. 18
LOCAL CODES OF ETHICS
COMMON LAW CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

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Program will feature a methodology for analyzing municipal ethics problems, highlights of the statewide code of conduct for municipal officers and employees, tips for drafting a local code of ethics, a guide to recognizing prohibited appearances of impropriety drawn from actual case studies, and an examination of the municipal attorney-client privilege.
How To Analyze an Ethics Problem: Recognizing Common Law Conflicts of Interest

By Steven G. Leventhal

In New York, most ethics problems can be analyzed by considering three questions: (1) does the conduct violate Article 18 of the New York General Municipal Law; (2) if not, does the conduct violate the local municipal code of ethics; and (3) if not, does the conduct seriously and substantially violate the spirit and intent of the law, and thus create a prohibited appearance of impropriety?

Article 18 of the New York General Municipal Law is the state law that establishes minimum standards of conduct for the officers and employees of all municipalities within the state, except the City of New York. Among other things, Article 18 prohibits a municipal officer and employee from having a financial interest in most municipal contracts that he or she has the power to control individually or as a board member; from accepting gifts or favors worth $75 or more where it might appear that the gift was intended to reward or influence an official action; from disclosing confidential government information; from receiving payment in connection with any matter before his or her own agency; and from receiving a contingency fee in connection with a matter before any agency of the municipality.

Local municipalities are authorized by Article 18 to adopt their own codes of ethics. A local ethics code may not permit conduct that is prohibited by Article 18. However, a local code may be stricter than Article 18; it may prohibit conduct that Article 18 would allow. Local ethics codes typically fill gaps in the coverage of Article 18 by, among other things, closing the “revolving door” (post-employment contacts with the municipality), establishing rules for the wearing of “two hats” (the holding of two government positions, or moonlighting in the private sector) and, in some cases, prohibiting “pay to play” practices and the political solicitation of subordinates, vendors, and contractors.

Ethics regulations are not only designed to promote high standards of official conduct, they are also designed to foster public confidence in government. An appearance of impropriety undermines public confidence. Therefore, courts have found that government officials have an implied duty to avoid conduct that seriously and substantially violates the spirit and intent of ethics regulations, even where no specific statute is violated. Organizing these precedents into a coherent set of principles is necessary in order to reconcile the equally important goals of fostering public confidence in government and helping honest municipal officers and employees to avoid unintended ethics violations by providing them with clear guidance on established standards of conduct.

What Is a Prohibited Appearance of Impropriety?

For lawyers engaged in the practice of law, the “appearance of impropriety” standard set forth in Rule 1.11(b)(2) of the N.Y. Rules of Professional Conduct is applied only in the screening of former government lawyers who move from one employer to another. It is otherwise considered “too vague a standard to justify disciplinary measures or disqualification.” Essex Eq. Holdings. v. Lehman Bros., Lovitch v. Lovitch (Absent actual prejudice, the appearance of impropriety is not sufficient to disqualify an attorney), Christensen v. Christensen (Appearance of impropriety is insufficient to disqualify attorney, without actual prejudice to a party.)

Professor Simon, in his commentary to R.P.C. Rule 1.11(b)(2), criticized the “appearance of impropriety” standard because it depends on what others might think:

The “appearance of impropriety” standard is a highly abstract, catch-all formulation that gives courts virtually boundless discretion to disqualify former government lawyers if anything in the circumstances makes the court uncomfortable. Negating the appearance of impropriety can be a significant hurdle . . . Of course, courts have sweeping inherent power to supervise lawyers who appear before them. . . . But in my view courts should not use the “appearance of impropriety” standard as a disciplinary standard, because a lawyer acting in good faith can easily misjudge what others might think about the lawyer’s conduct. Lawyers should not be subject to professional discipline for engaging in conduct that they sincerely think is proper but that some others might believe looks improper. The appearance of impropriety standard simply gives lawyers insufficient warning of the circumstances that will subject them
to discipline. In rare situations the “appearance of impropriety” standard is appropriate as a basis for disqualification, because a court can presumably weigh all of the facts and circumstances. But even in disqualification matters, the appearance of impropriety should be construed narrowly and invoked sparingly because construing it too broadly and using it too frequently would result in excessive disqualifications . . . .15

The application of the “appearance of impropriety” standard to judges is unique, based on the heightened standard of conduct for members of the judiciary.16

In drafting a local code of ethics that prohibits official conduct that would give rise to an appearance of impropriety, municipal attorneys should take care to avoid standards of conduct that may be declared unconstitutionally vague. In People v. Lanham, the Second Department explained when a statute is to be considered unconstitutionally vague.17 The court stated that:

[A] court must first determine whether the statute in question is sufficiently definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his or her contemplated conduct is forbidden. Second, the court must determine whether the enactment provides officials with clear standards for enforcement so as to avoid resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Accordingly, a statute is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions where it fails to give fair notice to the ordinary citizen that the prohibited conduct is illegal, and it lacks minimal legislative guidelines, thereby permitting arbitrary enforcement.18

In People v. Golb, the Court of Appeals struck down former Penal Law § 240.30(1), which prohibited communicating “in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.”19 The court observed that “the statute’s vagueness is apparent because it is not clear what is meant by communication ‘in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm’ to another person.”20 In Patricia Ann Cottage Pub, Inc. v. Mermelstein, a determination that the plaintiff violated Public Health Law § 1399-o was vacated on the grounds of vagueness because the law required bar owners to “make a reasonable effort to prevent smoking without providing any information as to what those reasonable efforts should be.”21

An “appearance of impropriety” standard will be unconstitutionally vague if it is not sufficiently definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his or her contemplated conduct is forbidden and it lacks minimal legislative guidelines, thereby permitting arbitrary enforcement. The Code of Ethics of the City of New York has a “catch-all” provision prohibiting interests that conflict with official duties, but it is supplemented by cross-references to specific examples of the conduct that is forbidden. The City Conflicts of Interest Board is prohibited from imposing penalties for a violation of the code’s “catch-all” provision “unless such violation involved conduct identified by rule of the board as prohibited by such paragraph.”22 The City Conflicts of Interest Board adopted a rule specifying certain conduct.23

Of course, even in the absence of a disqualifying conflict of interest, a municipal officer or employee may nevertheless choose to recuse himself or herself to avoid taking an action that might later be criticized. Officers and employees should be mindful, however, that recusal is not a neutral act. It is the functional equivalent of a “nay” vote. General Construction Law § 41 states:

Whenever three or more public officers are given any power or authority, or three or more persons are charged with any public duty to be performed or exercised by them jointly or as a board or similar body, … not less than a majority of the whole number may perform and exercise such power, authority or duty. For the purpose of this provision the words “whole number” shall be construed to mean the total number which the board, commission, body or other group of persons or officers would have were there no vacancies and were none of the persons or officers disqualified from acting.24

How Have Courts Applied the Standard to Actions by Local Governments?

Courts have invalidated municipal actions based on clear and obvious conflicts of interest that would undermine public confidence in government, even where no statute or local law was violated.

1. Pecuniary Interests, Secondary Employment, Controversy

In Tuxedo Conservation & Taxpayers Assn. v. Town Bd. of Town of Tuxedo, decided by the Second Department in
1979, the town board voted to approve a major development project on the eve of a change in the composition of the board. The decisive vote in favor of approval was cast by a trustee who was vice president of a public relations firm under contract to the developer’s parent company. The court inferred that the board’s approval of the development project would likely result in the public relations firm obtaining all of the advertising contracts connected with the project. Even though the board member’s vote did not violate Article 18 of the New York General Municipal Law, the court annulled the board’s decision approving the development project.

The Tuxedo court concluded that “while the anathema of the letter of the law may not apply to . . . [the board member’s] action, the spirit of the law was definitely violated. And since his vote decided the issue . . . [the court deemed it] egregious error.” The court directed the board member’s attention to the “soaring rhetoric of Chief Judge Cardozo . . . ‘[a] trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.’ Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive is then the standard of behavior.’” Thus, the court concluded that “the question reduces itself into one of interest. Was [the board member’s] vote prompted by the ‘jingling of the guinea’ or did he vote his conscience as a member of the town board? In view of the factual circumstances involved, the latter possibility strains credulity. For, like Caesar’s wife, a public official must be above suspicion.”

Reviewing decisions of the courts of other states, the Tuxedo court concluded that “[a]n amalgam of those cases indicates that the test to be applied is not whether there is a conflict, but whether there might be. . . . It is the policy of the law to keep the official so far from temptation as to ensure his unselfish devotion to the public interest.”

Six years later, in Zagoreos v. Conklin, the Second Department reaffirmed the principles announced in Tuxedo. There, a major, controversial development project was approved by votes of the Zoning Board of Appeals and the town board. At the ZBA, the decisive votes were cast by two board members who were employed by the applicant. At the town board, the decisive vote was cast by a board member who was employed by the applicant. As in Tuxedo, the court annulled the decisions of the ZBA and the town board approving the development project despite the fact that the respective board members’ votes did not violate Article 18 of the New York General Municipal Law.

The Zagoreos court noted that the employment of a board member by the applicant might not require disqualification in every instance. However, the failure of the board member-employees to disqualify themselves here was improper because the application was a matter of public controversy, and their votes in the matter were likely to undermine “people’s confidence in the legitimacy of the proceedings and the integrity of the municipal government.”

Further, the Zagoreos court noted that the importance of the project to the applicant-employer was obvious, and that “equally so are those subtle but powerful psychological pressures the mere knowledge of that importance must inevitably place on any employee of the [applicant-employer] who is in a position to either effectuate or frustrate the project and who is concerned for his or her future with the [applicant-employer]. Any attempt to disregard these realities would be senseless for the public is certainly aware of them.” The court found that even in the absence of any attempt by the applicant-employer to improperly influence the board member-employees, “human nature[,] being what it is . . . it is inconceivable that such considerations did not loom large in the minds of the three [board member-employees]. Under these circumstances, the likelihood that their employment by the . . . [applicant-employer] could have influenced their judgment is simply too great to ignore.”

Not every financial relationship between a board member and parties interested in a matter before the board gives rise to a disqualifying conflict of interest. In Parker v. Town of Gardiner Planning Bd., the Third Department observed that:

Resolution of questions of conflict of interest requires a case-by-case examination of the relevant facts and circumstances and the mere fact of employment or similar financial interest does not mandate disqualification of the public official involved in every instance. In determining whether a disqualifying conflict exists, the extent of the interest at issue must be considered and where a substantial conflict is inevitable, the public official should not act.

In Parker, the board chairman was president of a local steel fabrication and supply company that sold products to a local construction firm owned by one of the applicant’s principals. During the previous three years, the construction firm purchased between $400 and $3,000 in steel products from the chairman’s steel company. During the same period, the chairman’s steel company had annual gross sales of approximately $2 million to $3 million. Based on these facts, the New York attorney general concluded in an informal opinion letter that a conflict of interest existed and that the chairman was required to recuse himself from the matter. However, the town board of
Ethics reached a contrary conclusion, reasoning that the amount paid to the chairman as a result of the purchases by the applicant's construction firm was insufficient to create a conflict of interest. The Parker court concluded that the determination of the Town Board of Ethics was rational and entitled to considerable weight, and found that "[u]nder these circumstances . . . the likelihood that such a de minimis interest would or did in fact influence . . . [the chairman's] judgment and/or impair the discharge of his official duties . . . [was] little more than speculative." 49

In the years since Tuxedo and Zagoreos were decided, the appellate courts of this state have consistently reaffirmed the vitality of the principle that a prohibited conflict of interest may exist in the absence of a statutory prohibition and that a common law conflict of interest may justify the judicial invalidation of a municipal action. Moreover, the application of this principle has not been limited to cases involving conflicts based on pecuniary interests or economic improprieties. A prohibited conflict of interest may exist, and that conflict may justify judicial invalidation of a municipal action, where the voting members of a municipal board have manifested bias or have prejudged an application.

2. Bias, Prejudice, Expression of Opinion, Extent of Interest

In Schweichler v. Village of Caledonia, 50 three members of the village planning board signed a petition in support of a developer's project and application for rezoning and thus appeared to have impermissibly prejudged the application. 51 In addition, the planning board's chairperson wrote a letter to the mayor in support of the project and application for rezoning, stating that she "would really like to see new housing available to [her] should [she] decide to sell [her] home and move into something maintenance free." 52 Despite the fact that the planning board's vote to approve the developer's site plan did not violate Article 18 of the New York General Municipal Law, the Fourth Department concluded in Schweichler that the appearance of bias arising from the signatures of the three planning board members on the petition in support of the project and application, and the actual bias of the chairperson manifested by her letter to the mayor expressing a personal interest in the project, justified annulment of the planning board's site plan approval. 53

In Segalla v. Planning Board, a resident who, at public hearings, had opposed a zone change proposed by the owner of a gravel mining business, was appointed to fill a vacancy on the planning board and voted to approve a master plan that omitted the zone change. 54 The Second Department court held that because the alleged bias involved only personal opinion rather than any financial interest in the adoption of the master plan, there was no basis for setting aside the action of the planning board. Further, the speculation that the value of property owned by the planning board member might at some point in the future have been affected by the zone change was insufficient to disqualify a board member from voting, particularly where nearly every other property owner would be similarly affected.

In 1983, the Court of Appeals held in Webster Associates v. Webster, that public statements by the newly elected chairman of the town board before and after his election, expressing support for a development project and criticism of a competing proposal, did not warrant nullification of the board's approval. The court found that: The conflicts encompassed by article 18, however, involve pecuniary and material interests rather than expressions of personal opinion (see General Municipal Law, § 800, subd 3). Indeed, Tuxedo involved a town board member who voted to approve construction of a housing project while he was an officer of the advertising agency employed by the developer's parent company. No such financial interest was alleged here. Moreover, Kent's statements allegedly indicating bias in favor of the Expressway Associates plan actually show more that he was upset at the hasty manner in which, during its final days in office, the prior town board approved Webster Associates' proposal. In addition, although Kent spoke in favor of the Expressway Associates plan, he also repeatedly stated that he would act in an objective manner and in the best interest of the town when passing on zoning matters as a member of the town board. The courts below were correct in concluding that plaintiffs failed to show any action on the part of Kent, individually, that would provide a basis for setting aside the action of the town board.

It is curious that the Webster court would cite Tuxedo in discussing the interests encompassed by Article 18 since Tuxedo did not involve conduct that violated the statute; Tuxedo is the seminal case for the proposition that courts may invalidate a municipal action based on a clear and obvious conflict of interest that would undermine public confidence in government, even where no statute or local law was violated. Nevertheless, candidates for public office...
and elected officials must be free to express their views on matters of public concern and, once elected, to vindicate their electoral mandate.

While mere personal opinion will generally not give rise to a disqualifying conflict of interest, municipal actions are, of course, subject to judicial review in a proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR Art. 78. A reviewing court may nullify a municipal determination that was “arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion,” or that was not supported by substantial evidence adduced at a legally required hearing.59

3. Conflicts That Are Clear and Obvious

In Peterson v. Corbin, the Second Department court reversed a ruling that a county legislator was disqualified from voting for the appointment of members to the corporate board of the county OTB because his membership in the same bargaining unit that represented OTB employees created an “appearance of impropriety.”60 The court distinguished Tuxedo and Zagoros because, in those cases, “the questioned official benefited directly and individually from the action that was taken,” and “the conflicts of interest on the part of the public officials were clear and obvious.”61 In 2002, the attorney general opined that only a “substantial, direct personal interest in the outcome” requires recusal.62

Citing Peterson, the Fourth Department in Friedhaber v. Town Bd. of Town of Sheldon, affirmed a decision of the Appellate Term, First Department, that distinguished between the “clear and obvious” conflict that would have arisen from a vote to change the zoning status of particular properties owned by the voting board members, and their permissible vote to change the zoning status of other properties in which they had no interest.63 The court reasoned that:

Fontaine and Kehl disqualified themselves from voting on the actions pertaining to the clusters in which their properties are located. Petitioners assert that Fontaine and Kehl violated GML § 801 by voting to approve actions for the other clusters and by otherwise voting on matters involving the project . . . . Because Fontaine and Kehl will receive a “direct or indirect pecuniary or material benefit” only from the properties they own, and because the record reflects that each cluster can stand on its own as an independent project, the votes by Fontaine and Kehl as to the other clusters do not establish a prohibited conflict of interest. In any event, the record reflects that there was a sufficient number of votes to adopt each of the resolutions at issue even if Fontaine and Kehl had disqualified themselves from voting. . . . The only “clear and obvious” conflicts of interest were those possessed by Fontaine and Kehl and they appropriately disqualified themselves from the clusters in which they possessed an interest as defined under law. The other purported conflicts of interest alleged by the petitioners are not “clear and obvious” and are not the sort which should result in the court’s interference with legislative action. This court will not inject itself into the legislative process without a “clear and obvious” conflict of interest and without statutory authority granted by the State legislature . . . .64

In Town of Mamakating v. Village of Bloomingburg, two members of the three-member board of trustees rented homes from a company affiliated with the applicant’s principal.65 The Third Department observed that “[i]n determining whether a disqualifying conflict exists, the extent of the interest at issue must be considered and, where a substantial conflict is inevitable, the public official should not act.”66 The court was not persuaded that a substantial conflict was inevitable or that annulment of the board’s approval was warranted.67

4. Campaign Contributions

In 2022, the Third Department held in Evans v. City of Saratoga Springs, that the receipt of campaign contributions by members of the City Council did not give rise to a disqualifying conflict of interest in the adoption of amendments to the zoning code.68 The court concluded that:

Finally, we are unpersuaded by petitioners’ contention that members of the City Council were biased during the zoning amendment process and subject to a conflict of interest because they received campaign contributions from representatives of Saratoga Hospital. “In determining whether a disqualifying conflict exists, the extent of the interest at issue must be considered and, where a substantial conflict is inevitable, the public official should not act.” Although, under these circumstances, the receipt of campaign contributions may create an appearance of impropriety, we do not find that it gave rise to
Given the now well-established principal that a disqualifying conflict of interest may arise even where the conduct would not violate any statute or local law, it is curious again that the Evans court would look to the city’s Code of Ethics and the General Municipal Law to judge whether a conflict was substantial and inevitable.

5. Personal or Private Interests; Social Relationships

A common theme among many New York cases in which courts have declined to invalidate a municipal action based on the alleged conflicts of municipal officers and employees was the absence of a personal or private interest as distinguished from an interest shared by other members of the public generally. In 1975, the Court of Appeals held in Town of N. Hempstead v. Village of N. Hills, that village board members were not disqualified from voting on an amendment to the zoning code that would allow cluster zoning of properties that they owned, where a majority of the land in the village was similarly affected, and the disqualification of the board members would preclude all but a handful of property owners from voting in such matters.

Not every personal or private relationship between a board member and parties interested in a matter before the board will give rise to a disqualifying conflict of interest. Generally, a mere social relationship between a board member and the applicant will not give rise to a disqualifying conflict of interest where the board member will derive no benefit from the approved application.

For example, petitioner perceives a conflict of interest in the fact that the wife of one of the Board members teaches piano to the applicant’s daughter and was given a Christmas gift for doing so. Petitioner also contends that since the applicant is a long-term member of the Board, other junior Board members might have viewed him as their leader and might have been influenced even though the applicant disqualified himself from any Board consideration of the application. Petitioner sees a similar conflict in the applicant’s involvement in local politics, and in the fact that one of the Board members purchased homeowners’ and automobile insurance from the applicant. Petitioner also contends that one of the Board members was improperly influenced since his mother-in-law voiced her criticism of opponents to the applicant’s project. We are of the view that these claims, and others advanced by petitioner, do not rise above the type of speculation that would effectively make all but a handful of citizens ineligible to sit on the Board.

6. Proximity to the Subject Premises

Proximity to the site of an application, standing alone, does not give rise to a conflict of interest or appearance of impropriety; there must be additional factors present to cause a conflict of interest. In Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Fleming, the Third Department held that neither a town board member’s location near the subject property without evidence of financial gain or proprietary benefit, nor his opposition as a candidate running for public office on that platform does not constitute a
conflict of interest within the meaning of General Municipal Law § 801. Opposition to the project, without more, cannot constitute bias or a conflict of interest inasmuch as a contrary determination “would effectively make all but a handful of [the Town’s] citizens ineligible to sit on the [Town] Board”. Thus, because the alleged conflicts of interest and bias involve expressions of personal opinion, rather than any pecuniary or material interest in the denial of Troy Sand’s application, we find that petitioners failed to establish a basis for setting aside the determination of the Town Board. In Tulip Gardens, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, a 2009 trial court held that proximity of a board member to the applicant’s property, standing alone, did not disqualify a ZBA member from voting on an application for a variance. In 2002, the attorney general opined that a trustee who owned commercial property within a business improvement district was not necessarily disqualified from voting on the BID’s budget, since other factors needed to be considered. “[R]ecusal has not been required where a board member’s interest is merely similar to that of other property owners.” Recusal would be required where a municipal officer or employee has a “substantial, direct personal interest in the outcome.”

7. Pending Litigation

Pending litigation against a municipal board or its members does not ipso facto require that the board members recuse themselves in a separate application by the plaintiff. In 1998, a corporation applied to the village board for a permit authorizing the operation of a restaurant in a shopping center. A conditional permit was issued, and the applicant filed an action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking compensatory and punitive damages based on certain of the conditions imposed by the village board. The applicant sued the village and five village trustees, four of whom remained on the board. When the restaurant opened in violation of the terms of the conditional permit, the village brought a separate action seeking a permanent injunction. While the action was pending, the plaintiff transferred adjacent property to a related entity having common principles. The related entity filed an application for a permit to develop the adjacent property.

In a 2000 informal opinion, the attorney general advised that:

In municipalities experiencing extensive development, it is possible for developers to have actions pending that challenge a board’s land use decisions while continuing to make separate applications to that board for other developments. Absent specific allegations to the contrary, each application is presumed to be made and considered on its own merits. We recognize, however, that in particular situations recusal may be appropriate. The relevant factors can be enumerated, but it is impossible to say in advance which will be decisive or how much weight each should be assigned. Among factors that may be considered here, in applying conflict of interest standards, are exposure of board members to personal liability; whether there is an appearance of impropriety that would erode public confidence in the integrity of government; and the judgments of board members as to whether they can act impartially. Under facts such as those presented here, where the board members have been sued in their personal capacities for compensatory and punitive damages, exposure to personal liability is a particular concern in determining whether recusal is appropriate. There is a greater potential for conflict where the personal financial interests of a board member are antithetical to those of an applicant appearing before the board member. Therefore, a consideration is whether the municipality has authorized defense of board members and indemnification… in civil actions related to acts or omissions occurring within the scope of a member’s duties. Also relevant is the advice of the municipal attorney as to whether the litigation has merit. It may be apparent that an applicant’s action against board members in their personal capacities is frivolous or of little merit. Such a lawsuit should not necessitate that board members recuse themselves from hearing a subsequent application by the applicant who brought the pending lawsuit. Under these circumstances, recusal would not serve the public interest.
**What Is an Effective Recusal?**

All of the reported cases in New York that have invalidated municipal actions based on common law conflicts of interest involved decisive votes cast by conflicted members of voting bodies. However, it should be noted that recusal involves more than mere abstention from voting. A properly recused officer or employee will refrain from participating in the discussions, deliberations, or vote in a matter. The New York attorney general has opined that:

> The board member’s participation in deliberations has the potential to influence other board members who will exercise a vote with respect to the matter in question. Further, we believe that a board member with a conflict of interest should not sit with his or her fellow board members during the deliberations and action regarding the matter. The mere presence of the board member holds the potential of influencing fellow board members and additionally, having declared a conflict of interest, there would reasonably be an appearance of impropriety in the eyes of the public should the member sit on the board.

Thus, it is our view that once a board member has declared that he or she has a conflict of interest in a particular matter before the board, that the board member should recuse himself or herself from any deliberations or voting with respect to that matter by absenting himself from the body during the time that the matter is before it.

In *Eastern Oaks Development, LLC v. Town of Clinton,* the town planning board granted preliminary approval of a residential subdivision. The developer hired a member of the town board to construct a road meeting specifications required by the town engineer, and offered the road for dedication to the town, together with a bond to ensure the repair of any damage to the road surface that might occur during construction. A dispute arose between the developer and the retained board member over his alleged failure to pay a subcontractor, and the board member was discharged. When the offer of dedication was considered by the town board, the town engineer recommended that the offer of dedication be declined until a sufficient number of homes were constructed. With the formerly retained board member recusing himself from the vote, the town board disapproved the dedication.

The developer challenged the decision in an Article 78 proceeding, alleging, among other things, that the town board made its decision in advance of the vote, and that the conflicted board member had recused himself from the official vote only to conceal his conflict of interest and efforts to undermine the subdivision project by influencing members of the town board to disapprove the road dedication. The town moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a cause of action. In affirming the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss, the Second Department noted that the reason for the town's disapproval of the road dedication was consistent with earlier statements by the town engineer. Nevertheless, the court held that the allegation that the conflicted board member's dispute with the developer resulted in the town board's denial of the dedication would provide a basis for setting aside the town board's determination, even though the conflicted board member recused himself from the vote.

Accordingly, a municipal action that resulted from the influence or persuasion of a conflicted member of a voting body should also bear critical scrutiny and, where appropriate, may result in judicial invalidation, even where the conflicted member refrained from voting. Accordingly, a conflicted board member should not participate from the audience. A change of seating does not eliminate the conflict.

**Ministerial Acts Do Not Give Rise to a Conflict of Interest**

Conflicts of interest are prohibited because they actually or potentially interfere with the judgment involved in the exercise of discretion. Many municipal actions involving no exercise of discretion and, therefore, are ministerial. In *Blumberg v. North Hempstead,* the court stated that “[s]ite plan approval is a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.” Other examples of ministerial acts are addressed in opinions of the comptroller and the attorney general: issuance of a check is a ministerial act not contemplated by General Municipal Law § 801; mayor signing contract was ministerial act and, therefore, there is no prohibited conflict of interest; budgeting for uncollectible taxes is a ministerial act not subject to discretion.

An action that is required by a statute does not involve the exercise of discretion and, therefore, is ministerial. In *Walz v. Town of Smithtown,* the issuance of an excavation permit was a ministerial act, and the highway superintendent had no discretion to deny the permit. The State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) recognizes the distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts—ministerial acts are not “actions” subject to SEQRA review.
SEQRA Regulation 6 NYCRR § 617.2 defines a ministerial act for SEQRA purposes:

“[m]inisterial act” means an action performed upon a given state of facts in a prescribed manner imposed by law without the exercise of any judgment or discretion as to the propriety of the act, such as the granting of a hunting or fishing license.

**Compatibility of Secondary Employment**

Long-established common law principles and opinions of the New York comptroller and attorney general offer useful guidance in determining whether a position of outside employment would create a conflict with the official duties of a municipal officer or employee. In the absence of a specific constitutional or statutory prohibition, one person may simultaneously hold two positions unless they are incompatible.\(^87\) The leading case on compatibility of public offices is *People ex rel. Ryan v. Green.*\(^88\) In that case, the Court of Appeals held that two public offices are incompatible if one is subordinate to the other (i.e., you cannot be your own boss) or if there is an inherent inconsistency between the two offices. Although the *Ryan* case involved two public offices, the same principle applies to the compatibility of a public office and a position of private employment. To determine whether two positions are inherently inconsistent, it is necessary to analyze their respective duties. An obvious example of two offices with inconsistent duties is that of auditor and director of finance.

Even where there is no inherent incompatibility between the respective duties of the two positions and, therefore, both positions may be held by the same person, conflicts of interests may nevertheless arise from time to time. In that case, recusal will cure the conflict. However, if recusal is frequently and inevitably required, that may be an indication that the position of secondary employment is incompatible with the official duties of the officer or employee. Incompatibility cannot be cured by recusal because the duties of one position will prevent the conflicted officer or employee from discharging the duties of the other.

**The Rule of Necessity**

The “rule of necessity” is derived from principles of judicial ethics. It will permit a conflicted officer or employee to act where the action is necessary and where there is no one to whom the responsibility may be lawfully delegated. In *Duquette v. Town of Peru Town Bd.*, the town board was the only body that could consider an application by three of its five members for a defense provided by the town pursuant to Public Officers Law § 18.\(^89\) Without the participation of the three members, the board would be left without a quorum and unable to vote.\(^90\) The court dismissed a claim that the board’s action in approving the application was tainted by the votes of the three interested members.\(^91\) Similarly, a vote by legislators to approve a budget that funds their own salaries would be permitted by the rule of necessity since a municipality must have a budget, and there is no other body to which its approval may lawfully be delegated.

Article III, Section 1 of the New York Constitution vests the legislative power of the state in the Senate and the Assembly. Therefore, the Legislature cannot delegate its law-making functions to other bodies. However, there is no constitutional prohibition against the delegation of power to an agency or commission to administer the law as enacted by the Legislature, provided there are reasonable standards to govern the discretion exercised in the administration of the law.\(^92\) The same principle of separation of powers will, in some cases, limit the ability of a local legislative body to delegate its decision-making authority. In a 2000 informal opinion, the attorney general stated that the determination of a development application was not a legislative act and, therefore, a village board of trustees could delegate consideration of such applications to an administrative board.\(^93\)

In some instances, even where delegation of decision-making authority is permissible, there may be limits on the discretion to select a delegate. For example, in disciplinary proceedings conducted under Civil Service § 75, the delegation of decision-making authority must be to a duly qualified individual authorized to act during the absence of the disqualified decision-maker, with no previously involvement in the proceeding or charges.\(^94\)

**Applying Common Law Principles**

In summary, courts may set aside board decisions (and, by implication, other municipal actions) where decision-making officials with conflicts of interest have failed to recuse themselves or where decision-making officials have been improperly influenced by a conflicted colleague. A disqualifying interest is one that is personal or private. It is not an interest that an official shares with all other citizens or property owners. A prohibited appearance of impropriety will not be found where the improper appearances are speculative or trivial.

In considering whether a prohibited appearance of impropriety has arisen, the question is whether an officer or employee has engaged in or influenced decisive official action despite having a disqualifying conflict of interest that
is clear and obvious, such as where the action is contrary to public policy, or raises the specter of self-interest or partiality.

Where a contemplated action by an official might create an appearance of impropriety, the official should refrain from acting. Officials should be vigilant in avoiding real and apparent conflicts of interest. They should consider not only whether they believe that they can fairly judge a particular application or official matter, but also whether it may appear that they did not do so. Even a good faith and public-spirited action by a conflicted public official will tend to undermine public confidence in government by confirming to a skeptical public that government serves to advance the private interests of public officials rather than to advance the public interest.

At the same time, officials should be mindful of their obligation to discharge the duties of their offices and should recuse themselves only when the circumstances actually merit recusal. Such restraint should be exercised by the members of voting bodies and, in particular, by legislators because recusal or abstention by a member of a voting body has the same effect as a “nay” vote and, in the case of an elected legislator, also has the effect of disenfranchising voters. In the rare case where the recusal of an officer or employee disqualified by a common law conflict of interest will leave the municipality without any authorized decision maker, the rule of necessity may permit the otherwise disqualified officer or employee to act notwithstanding the conflict of interest.

The goal of prevention—and just plain fairness—require that officers and employees have clear advance knowledge of what conduct is prohibited. Discernable standards of conduct help dedicated municipal officers and employees to avoid unintended violations and unwarranted suspicion. These standards are derived from Article 18 of the New York General Municipal Law, local municipal codes of ethics, and from the application of common law principles.

Steven G. Leventhal is the managing member of the Roslyn general practice firm of Leventhal, Mullaney & Blinkoff, LLP. An earlier version of this article appeared in Municipal Ethics in New York: A Primer for Attorneys and Public Officials, © 2016 New York State Bar Association; updated 2022.

Endnotes
5. Sapna, n. 3.
6. Id.
11. 29 Misc. 3d 371, 382 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2010).
12. 64 A.D. 3d 710, 711 (2d Dept 2009).
14. Compare the vague standard of conduct imposed by R.P.C. 8.4 (Misconduct) —“A lawyer or law firm shall not: (b) engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects of the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer.” The rule is not limited to misconduct related to the practice of law. As noted by Professor Simon, “Rule 8.4(b) is broad and vague. What does that mean? What kinds of conduct reflect adversely on the lawyer’s fitness specifically as a lawyer, as opposed to the lawyer's fitness as a parent, sibling, citizen, spouse, or human being? . . . Rule 8.4 is seldom the sole basis for disciplinary charges against a lawyer. Rather, it is usually an add-on to other charges. Typically, a court first finds a violation of some other section of the Rules and then finds that the violation of the other section reflects negatively on the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer. When the courts do find a violation of Rule 8.4(b), the conduct tends to be egregious . . . .” Roy D. Simon Jr., Simon’s New York Rules of Professional Conduct Annotated, 2067 (2022 ed., 2022).
15. Id. at 815.
16. See, e.g., Matter of Ayres, 30 N.Y.3d 59 (2017) (Town judge removed for “lending the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of others”).
17. 177 A.D.3d 637 (2d Dep’t 2019).
18. Id. at 637–38 (citing People v. Stephens, 28 N.Y.3d 307 (2016)).
20. Id. at 467 (citation omitted) (internal quotes omitted).
21. 36 A.D. 3d 816, 819 (2d Dep’t 2007).
22. N.Y.C. Charter § 2606(d).
25. 69 A.D.2d 320 (2d Dep’t 1979).
26. Id. at 323.
27. Id. at 326.
28. Id. (The vote did not violate § 801 of the New York General Municipal Law (Conflicts of interest prohibited) because that section generally prohibits a municipal officer or employee from having an interest in a...
contract with the municipality where he or she has the power or duty to approve or otherwise control the contract but, in *Tuxedo*, there was no contract with the town; and the vote did not violate § 809 of the New York General Municipal Law (Disclosure in certain applications) because that section only requires the disclosure of any interest of an officer or employee in a land use applicant—it does not mandate recusal by the interested officer or employee, etc.)

29. *Id.* at 324.
31. *Id.*
32. *Id.*
33. *Id.* at 325.
34. 109 A.D.2d 281 (2d Dep’t 1985).
35. *Id.*
36. *Id.* at 285.
37. *Id.* at 286–87.
38. As in *Tuxedo*, *supra*, the vote did not violate § 801 of the New York General Municipal Law (Conflicts of interest prohibited) because there was no contract with the town; and the vote did not violate section 809 of the New York General Municipal Law (Disclosure in certain applications) because that section only requires disclosure of any interest of an officer or employee in a land use applicant.

40. *Id.* at 288.
41. *Id.*
42. *Id.; See also, Conrad v. Hinman*, 122 Misc.2d 531 (Onondaga Co. 1984) (Trial court annulled a change from residential to commercial use granted by a village board of trustees based on an “... inference of [an] actual or apparent economic impropriety...” where the decisive vote was cast by a village trustee who was co-owner of the subject property and was also an employee of the intended purchaser).

44. 184 A.D.2d 937.
45. *Id.* at 398.
46. *Id.*
47. *Id.*
48. *Id.*
49. *Id.* (Citations omitted).
51. *Id.* at 1283–84.
52. *Id.* at 1284.
53. *Id.* at 1283–84 (adding that this was the case even though there was no "technical violation" of *General Municipal Law*).

54. 204 A.D. 2d 332 (2d Dep’t 1994).
55. *Id.* at 333.
56. *Id.*
58. *Id.* at 227.
59. See, Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7803.
60. 275 A.D. 2d 35, 38 (2d Dep’t 2000).
61. *Id.* at 38.
63. 16 Misc. 3d 1140A (App. Term 1st Dep’t 2007), aff’fd, 59 A.D.3d 1006 (4th Dep’t 2009); *see also, Peterson v. Corbin*, 275 A.D.2d 35 (2d Dep’t 2000) (noting that “... in both *Tuxedo* and *Zagoreos*, the conflicts of interest on the part of the public officials were clear and obvious.”).

64. 16 Misc. 3d 1140A (internal citations omitted).
65. 174 A.D.3d 1175 (3d Dep’t 2019).
66. *Id.* at 1179 (quoting Parker, 184 A.D.2d 937).
67. *Id.*
68. 202 A.D.3d 1318 (3d Dep’t 2022).
69. *Id.* at 1324 (internal citations omitted).

70. See, e.g., *Tuxedo*, *supra*.
71. 38 N.Y.2d 334 (1975); *See also, Byer v. Town of Poestenkill*, 232 A.D.2d 851 (3d Dep’t 1996) (town board member not disqualified from voting on changes to zoning code that affected all property owners equally); *Segalla v. Planning Board of the Town of Amenia*, 204 A.D.2d 332 (2d Dep’t 1992) (planning board member not disqualified from voting to approve master plan that affected nearly every property in the town equally).


74. 156 A.D.3d 1295 (3d Dep’t 2017).
75. *Id.* at 1304 (internal citations omitted).
78. *Id.; The attorney general has opined that a local law may authorize defense and indemnification in an action for punitive damages. See, e.g. Op. Atty. Gen (Inf) No. 93-22. However, courts have held otherwise. “[P]unitive damages may be assessed against a municipal employee who engages in intentional wrongdoing in excess of the scope of his official duties. Under such circumstances, the employee will not be entitled to indemnification (Public Officers Law § 18 [4] [b], [c]), but, rather, will be personally liable for any punitive damages assessed against him.” Rosen & Bardunias v. County of Westchester, 158 A.D. 2d 679, 681 (2d Dep’t), app. denied, 76 N.Y.2d 703 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1086 (1991).

79. See, e.g., *Tuxedo* and *Zagoreos*, *supra*.
80. 1995 Op. Atty. Gen 2; *see also, Cahm v. Planning Bd. of the Town of Gardiners*, 157 A.D.2d 252 (3d Dep’t 1990) (Planning Board members “not only immediately disclosed their interests, but of critical importance, they abstained from any discussion or voting regarding the subdivisions . . .”).
82. 76 A.D.3d 676 (2d Dep’t 2010).
83. 114 Misc. 2d 8, 14 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1982).
84. 1979 N.Y. Comp. Lexis 217, Opinion No. 79-147 (conflicts of interest prohibited); 1982 N.Y. Comp. Lexis 416, Opinion No. 82-319; 1982 N.Y. AG Lexis 110, Informal Opinion No. 82-1.
85. 46 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1995).
86. 6 N.Y.C.R.R. 617.2(k).
88. 58 N.Y. 295 (1874).
89. 18 Misc. 3d 1129(A) (Clinton Co. 2008).
90. *Id.*
91. *Id.*
96. See, Gen. Const. Law §41.
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LEXJAC, LLC V. INC. VILLAGE OF MUTTONTOWN: SECOND CIRCUIT CLARIFIES KEY ELEMENTS OF N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW ART. 18

Steven G. Leventhal

More than half a century after the enactment of the statewide code of ethics for local municipalities, Article 18 of the New York General Municipal Law ("N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law"), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ("Second Circuit") has finally clarified several of its core provisions.

Article 18 of the N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law establishes minimum standards of conduct for the officers and employees of all municipalities within the state other than the City of New York. As noted by the New York Court of Appeals in Landau v. Percaccio, the statute was adopted in 1964 with the expressed purpose "to protect the public from municipal contracts influenced by avaricious officers."

N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801 prohibits a municipality from entering into a contract that will benefit an officer or employee with control over the contract. The statute is violated if three elements are established: (1) the existence of a contract with the municipality, (2) an interest (i.e. a benefit) accruing to an officer or employee of the municipality as a result of the contract, and (3) the power or duty of the officer or employee, either individually or as a member of a board, to negotiate, prepare, autho-

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rize or approve the contract, or to appoint an officer or employee that has any of those powers or duties. A contract willfully entered into in violation of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801 is null, void and wholly unenforceable pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 804.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

At a public hearing on July 2, 1969, the Village of Muttontown Planning Board approved a subdivision map conditioned upon the dedication to the Village of Muttontown ("Village") of a 1.1 acre parcel of land located in the Village’s half-acre zoning district ("Smallacre") for recreation purposes and tender of a deed. On July 27, 1972, the subdivision developer, Foreal Homes, Inc. ("Foreal"), irrevocably offered Smallacre to the Village for dedication as parkland pursuant to N.Y. Village Law § 7-730(4). Foreal tendered a written offer of dedication and a warranty deed. The offer of dedication was recorded in the office of the Nassau County Clerk and was noted on the subdivision map filed with the County Clerk. However, in the decades that followed, the Village took no steps to formally accept the offer of dedication.

In 1988, the New York Court of Appeals, affirming a decision of the Second Department, rejected Foreal’s attempt to revoke the offer of dedication because, inter

alia, the subdivision residents purchased their homes in reliance upon the offer of dedication noted on the subdivision map.

In 1996, Entel and his then wife purchased an abutting 3.3 acre residential property in an adjoining subdivision. In May 2002, Entel was appointed by the then Mayor to fill a vacancy on the Village Board of Trustees. Entel informed the Mayor that he wished to purchase Smallacre, but that he didn’t “want to spend any money on it and do any refurbishing of it and then have the Village take it away from . . . [him] by accepting this offer of dedication.” Several months later, Entel informed the Mayor that he had “made a deal” with Foreal for the purchase of Smallacre, but that “he wouldn’t do it unless the Village extinguished their [sic] right or abandoned their [sic] right to take the property.”

In a letter dated October 31, 2003, Entel’s attorney informed the then Village Attorney of Entel’s intention to purchase Smallacre. The Village Attorney responded in a letter dated December 23, 2003, informing Entel’s attorney that:

... The filed offer of dedication does not in any way preclude the transfer of fee title to the parcel, but such transfer would be subject to the outstanding offer of dedication and the ultimate divesting of all rights, title and interest of the then current owner of the land without compensation at the time the offer is accepted by the Village...

In December 2003, Entel, acting through Lexjac, purchased Smallacre from Foreal for $90,000. A contemporaneous appraisal valued the development rights to the 1.1 acre parcel at $1,600,000. Entel proceeded to landscape Smallacre and incorporate it into the back yard of his abutting residential property.

On October 17, 2005, while Entel was a Village Trustee, the Village adopted a resolution (the “2005 Resolution”) declining the offer of dedication in exchange for Entel’s promise to plant and maintain screen plantings, among other things. As a result, Entel, through Lexjac, acquired unencumbered title to Smallacre, which was then free of any restrictions on development as two building lots.

The minutes of the October 17, 2005 meeting indi-
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cated that Entel abstained from the vote. Contemporaneous notes of the meeting indicated that Entel attended an executive session that preceded the public meeting, that the "parkland resolution & conditions re: maintaining" were discussed in the executive session, and that the 2005 Resolution was then approved in a public session.

The terms upon which the Village would release all of its right, title and interest in Smallacre were discussed by Trustee Entel and the then Mayor in advance of the October 17, 2005 meeting of the Board of Trustees. In a note dated October 5, 2005, the former Mayor informed the Village Attorney that "I don't want to jeopardize Rich Entel's ability to gift the development rights and get a tax deduction."

On July 10, 2007, a mostly new Village Board of Trustees adopted a resolution rescinding the 2005 Resolution and accepting the irrevocable offer of dedication.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Lurking beneath the statutory language was a host of unresolved legal issues.

- Can the agreement by a municipality to relinquish an interest in real property offered for dedication to the municipality, conditioned upon the performance of landscaping services, be a "contract" within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801?

- If so, would the recusal of the interested officer or employee cure the statutory violation?

- If not, would the interested officer or employee need to know that his agreement with the municipality was a contract in order for the violation to be "willful" and thus void?

- If not, could the violation be waived by the actions of the municipality or by the passage of time?

- If not, would the interested officer or employee be entitled to procedural due process before the municipality reclaimed the property interest?

ROUND ONE

Initially, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York ("District Court") granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs Entel and Lexjac ("Plaintiffs") finding that the Village had confiscated Smallacre in violation of their right to procedural due process. The district court reasoned that the 2005 Resolution was a "final (albeit belated) step in the village's original approval of the subdivision plat" and not a contract. Therefore, the 2005 Resolution was a land use application governed by N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 809, which merely required disclosure by Lexjac of Entel's interest in the application. After a jury trial, Plaintiffs were awarded compensatory damages of $1,450,000.

In a summary order dated June 22, 2015, the Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the District Court. The Second Circuit held that the 2005 Resolution was a contract within the meaning of the N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law and not merely a land use application.

For purposes of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801, a "contract" is defined as "any claim, account or demand against or agreement with a municipality, express or implied." Here, the 2005 Resolution provided that the Village would give up a valuable property interest in exchange for Entel's commitment to provide adequate care of Smallacre. The court noted that "the relinquishment of a valuable right in exchange for a promise of services constitutes a contract." Therefore, the agreement by a municipality to relinquish a property interest, conditioned upon the officer's performance of landscaping services, was a contract within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801.

ROUND TWO

The Second Circuit remanded the case for the court below to consider whether the 2005 Resolution was null and void pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law §§ 801 and 804 notwithstanding plaintiff Entel's purported recusal, and for further proceedings consistent with the summary order. Upon remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Village, finding that the 2005 Resolution was null and void.
The court directed that the Plaintiff's transfer Smallacre to the Village and dismissed the complaint. In a summary order dated September 8, 2017, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 13

All three elements of a N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801 violation were established: a contract with the municipality; a benefit accruing to a municipal officer or employee; and the power or duty of that officer or employee to control the contract.

There was no dispute that Entel derived a benefit from the 2005 Resolution. Through his instrumentality, Lexjac, he acquired unencumbered title to two building lots, purchased at a price of $90,000 which, without any restriction on development, was appraised at $1,600,000.

The benefit derived by Entel constituted an “interest” in the 2005 Resolution. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 800(3) defines the term “interest” as “a direct or indirect pecuniary or material benefit accruing to a municipal officer or employee as the result of a contract with the municipality which such officer or employee serves.” 14 For purposes of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801, a municipal officer or employee is deemed to have an interest in the contract of “a firm, partnership or association of which such officer or employee is a member.” 15

In 1977, the State Comptroller of New York (“State Comptroller”) responded to an inquiry involving a village trustee who owned property that adjoined a parcel owned by the village. The trustee proposed that the village quitclaim title to the parcel to him. As consideration for the parcel, the trustee proposed to grant an easement to the village over the parcel and his adjoining land. The proposal did not involve any exchange of monetary consideration. The State Comptroller opined that:

The benefit to the trustee does not necessarily have to be pecuniary in nature in order for him to have a statutory interest in the agreement with the village. This interest is prohibited by General Municipal Law § 801(1) because the trustee, as a member of the board of trustees, has the power or duty to approve the agreement. Village Law § 4-412(1). In this regard, it is immaterial that the trustee dissociates himself from board proceedings relative to the transaction. The § 801(1) prohibition stems from the power or duty of the trustee to approve or authorize the contract, etc., and it is irrelevant that he refrains from the exercise of that power or the performance of such duty. 16

Finally, the power to approve village contracts is vested in the Board of Trustees. 17 Here, the Board of Trustees exercised that power in adopting the 2005 Resolution. Trustee Entel, as a member of the board, had the power or duty to negotiate, prepare, authorize or approve the contract.


N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 802 sets forth exceptions to § 801. Recusal is not among them. At least one of the statutory exceptions would be unnecessary if the vote of an interested municipal official was an essential element of a N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law violation. A contract that was entered into prior to the election or appointment of an official is deemed “grandfathered” and does not give rise to a violation of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801. 18 Such a contract would obviously have been approved without the official’s vote. The “grandfather” exception would be unnecessary if such a contract, originally approved without a vote by the interested official, was not otherwise prohibited by N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801.

In Dykeman v. Symonds, 19 the Fourth Department affirmed a trial court ruling that an interested legislator’s recusal did not relieve her of the “power or duty” referred to in Section 801, because that “power or duty” came from the position she held, whether or not she voted on particular matters. Dykeman involved a county legislator who was elected to office while concurrently serving as motor vehicle supervisor for the county. The Fourth Department concluded that the legislator’s employment contract was a “direct violation” of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801 because the legislator’s salary as motor vehicle supervisor was subject to approval by the legislature, and the two positions were inherently incompatible because the legislator could not hold both without violating N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801. 20 Abstention from the vote was not a cure because the conflict arose from the legislator’s “power
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or duty,” as a member of the county legislature, to approve the terms of the employment contract and not from her vote in exercise of that power.

Dykeman was problematic precedent. First, the court’s analysis focused on the compatibility of the two public offices rather than the statutory elements of a prohibited contract. Under common law principles, in the absence of a specific constitutional or statutory prohibition, one person may simultaneously hold two public offices unless they are incompatible. The leading case on compatibility of offices is People ex rel. Ryan v. Green,²¹ in which the Court of Appeals held that two offices are incompatible if one is subordinate to the other (i.e., you cannot be your own boss) or if there is an inherent inconsistency between the two offices. Although Ryan involved two public offices, the same principle applies to the compatibility of a public office and a position of employment.²² To determine whether two positions are inherently inconsistent, it is necessary to analyze their respective duties. An obvious example of two offices with inconsistent duties is those of auditor and director of finance.²³

Further, neither the Dykeman trial court nor the Appellate Division addressed the fact that the employment contract, which was entered into before the legislator was elected to office, fell within the “grandfather” exception of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 802(1)(h).

Nevertheless, despite the flawed analysis in Dykeman, its conclusion was sound and consistently shared by other authorities. Many opinions of the State Comptroller, relied upon for decades by municipalities throughout the state, and the learned commentary similarly concluded that recusal cannot cure a violation of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801.²⁴ No reported case, administrative opinion, or learned commentary has concluded that recusal may validate a contract otherwise prohibited by N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801.

Entel’s status as a Village Trustee gave him the “power or duty” to approve village contracts within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801. For that reason, his recusal from the vote that approved the contract that gave him full title to the 1.1 acre parcel did not cure his violation of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801, nor did it prevent the contract from being “null, void and wholly unenforceable” under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 804.

The 2005 Resolution was Void Ab Initio because Entel Willfully Entered into the Contract Despite Having a Prohibited Interest.

The civil nullification of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 804 is triggered by the willful making of a contract in which there is a prohibited interest. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 804 provides: “Any contract willfully entered into by or with a municipality in which there is an interest prohibited by this article shall be null, void and wholly unenforceable.”²⁵

By contrast, the criminal liability imposed by N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 805 is triggered by a willful and knowing violation of the statute: “Any municipal officer or employee who willfully and knowingly violates the foregoing provisions of this article shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”²⁶

The term “willful” is not defined in Article 18 of the N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law nor in the previous cases interpreting the statute. Black’s Law Dictionary 1737 (⁹th ed. 2009) defines the term “willful” as “voluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious.”

Citing Landau, supra, the New York State Comptroller opined in 1985 that:

A contract is “willfully” entered into by a party if, at the time of making the contract, he had knowledge of facts which, under General Municipal Law, Article 18, constitute a prohibited interest in the contract on the part of a municipal officer or employee . . . . Clearly, the former supervisor’s spouse was aware that her husband was the supervisor of the town when she agreed to prepare the report for compensation. As a result the claim of the former supervisor’s spouse for six hundred dollars is rendered null and void by General Municipal Law, § 804 and should not be paid by the town.²⁷

Needless to say, at the time Entel actively pursued and personally made the contract here, Entel was aware that he was a Village Trustee.

In Bryan v. United States,²⁸ the United States Su-
The Supreme Court ("Supreme Court") distinguished between the frequent meaning of "willful" in a civil context and its different use in a criminal context. In the latter, "the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful." The Supreme Court stated that:

The word 'willfully' is sometimes said to be a word of many meanings whose construction is often dependent on the context in which it appears. Most obviously, it differentiates between deliberate and unwitting conduct, but in the criminal law it also typically refers to a culpable state of mind. The word often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But when used in a criminal statute it generally means an act done with a bad purpose.

Here, definitions from criminal law were inapplicable as this case dealt only with a civil nullification under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 804 and not with a criminal conviction under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 805.

Consistent with the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Bryan, the "willfulness" required for civil nullification under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 804 is a lesser mental state than the willfulness and knowledge required for a criminal conviction under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 805. The latter section provides that "any municipal officer or employee who willfully and knowingly violates the foregoing provisions of this article shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." The element of "knowledge" required for the commission of a misdemeanor under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 805 is absent from N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 804, which requires only that the contract be "willfully entered into" in order to render the contract void.

Though contrary to the facts here, a municipal officer or employee may acquire an interest in a municipal contract without willfully entering into the contract. For example, such a contract may exist even where the municipal officer or employee is not a party to the contract. An officer or employee will be deemed to have an interest in contracts of certain relatives, dependents and business entities pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 800(3), which defines the term "interest" for purposes of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801 as:

a direct or indirect pecuniary or material benefit accruing to a municipal officer or employee as the result of a contract with the municipality which such officer or employee serves. For the purposes of this article a municipal officer or employee shall be deemed to have an interest in the contract of (a) his spouse, minor children and dependents, except a contract of employment with the municipality which such officer or employee serves, (b) a firm, partnership or association of which such officer or employee is a member or employee, (c) a corporation of which such officer or employee is an officer, director or employee and (d) a corporation any stock of which is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such officer or employee.

A relative or a corporate employer of a municipal officer or employee may enter into a municipal contract without any participation by the municipal officer or employee. Similarly, an officer or employee who is the beneficiary of a trust may have an interest in contracts made by the trustee without his or her participation.

Thus, an officer or employee may unwittingly acquire an interest in a municipal contract. Under such circumstances, the officer or employee would not have willfully entered into a contract that violated N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801, and the contract would not be void pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 804.

Here, because Entel willfully entered into the contract memorialized in the 2005 Resolution the contract was null, void and wholly unenforceable pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 804.

The 2005 Resolution was also Invalid Based on Common Law Principles because Entel Improperly Influenced the Mayor and Trustees.

Even in the absence of a statutory prohibition under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801, Entel’s common law conflict of interest, and the influence he exerted, warranted the court’s invalidation of the 2005 Resolution.

Entel did not validly "recuse" himself from the discussions and deliberations leading to the adoption of the 2005 Resolution. Rather, its adoption was the culmination of three years of planning, preparation and discussions among Entel, the then Mayor and the then Village Attorney that included Entel’s conversations with the Mayor prior to his purchase of Smallacre, his attendance at the executive session when the matter was considered, and his statement to the Board of Trustees that he would not develop the property.
Recusal involves more than the mere abstention from a vote. A properly recused officer or employee will refrain from participating in the discussions, deliberations or vote in a matter.  

The New York Attorney General opined in 1995 that:

The board member’s participation in deliberations has the potential to influence other board members who will exercise a vote with respect to the matter in question. Further, we believe that a board member with a conflict of interest should not sit with his or her fellow board members during the deliberations and action regarding the matter. The mere presence of the board member holds the potential of influencing fellow board members and additionally, having declared a conflict of interest, there would reasonably be an appearance of impropriety in the eyes of the public should the member sit on the board. Thus, it is our view that once a board member has declared that he or she has a conflict of interest in a particular matter before the board, that the board member should recuse himself or herself from any deliberations or voting with respect to that matter by absenting himself from the body during the time that the matter is before it.

In *Eastern Oaks*, cited *supra*, the Second Department held that influence by a conflicted board member would be a sufficient basis for invalidating an action of the board, even where the conflicted member recused himself from the vote. There, a town planning board granted preliminary approval of a residential subdivision. The developer hired a member of the town board to construct a road, meeting specifications required by the town engineer, and offered the road for dedication to the town, together with a bond to ensure the repair of any damage to the road surface that might occur during construction.

A dispute arose between the developer and the contractor-board member over his alleged failure to pay a subcontractor. When the offer of dedication was considered by the town board, the town engineer recommended that the offer of dedication be declined until a sufficient number of homes were constructed. With the contractor-board member recusing himself from the vote, the town board declined to accept the dedication.

The developer challenged the decision in a special proceeding brought pursuant to Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, alleging, among other things, that the town board made its decision in advance of the vote, and the contractor-board member had recused himself from the official vote only to conceal his conflict of interest and his efforts to undermine the subdivision project by influencing members of the town board to disapprove the road dedication. The town moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a cause of action.

In affirming the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, the Second Department held that the allegation that the contractor-board member’s dispute with the developer resulted in the town board’s denial of the dedication would provide a sufficient basis for setting aside the town board’s determination, even though the conflicted board member recused himself from the vote. The appellate court stated: “[G]iven the allegations in the petition regarding Budd’s dispute with Eastern, the allegation that Budd, although recused from the official vote, brought about the Town Board’s denial of the offer of cessation because of that dispute, would provide a basis for setting aside the Town Board’s determination.”

Here, Entel’s influence was evident in his communications with the Mayor and Trustees, and in the Mayor’s October 5, 2015 note to the Village Attorney stating that “I don’t want to jeopardize Rich Entel’s ability to gift the development rights and get a tax deduction.” Accordingly, Entel cannot properly be said to have recused himself. Rather, he merely abstained from the vote. His abstention was ineffective as a recusal because he improperly exerted his influence over the decision of the then Mayor and Trustees.

**A Violation of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801 May Not be Waived.**


The Section [N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 804] makes null and void any municipal contract “in which there is an interest prohibited by this article.” The only prohibi-
tion set forth in the article is that found in Section 801, which provides that no municipal officer or employee shall have an interest in a contract with his municipality if he has the power or duty to negotiate or to approve the contract or payments thereunder, to audit bills or claims under the contract, or to appoint an officer or employee with any such authority. As to contracts in which such an interest exists, Section 804 of the General Municipal Law works a statutory nullification, thereby providing for municipal taxpayers the protection of a bar to any waiver of the prohibited conflicts of interest through consent of the governing body or authority of the municipality (such as may be effected in the private sector by a principal with respect to an agent who participates in the making of a contract on the principal’s behalf).

Landau involved an action for specific performance of a town contract to purchase real property following a failure to disclose a town employee’s interest in the contract as required by N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 803. Landau did not involve a contract that was prohibited by N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801 because the town employee had no power or duty to approve the contract. Therefore, the civil nullification imposed by N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 804 did not apply. Nevertheless, the Landau court declined to grant specific performance of the contract stating that success by the plaintiff would frustrate the purpose of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law Article 18 “to protect the public from municipal contracts influenced by avaricious officers.”

Entell’s expenditures to “clean up” Smallacre, which inured to his own benefit, could not justify a claim of detrimental reliance (i.e. quasi contract). Rather, the actual contract between Entell and the Village violated public policy and, by statute, was “null, void and wholly unenforceable.” In Smith v. Dep’t of Education, a Virgin Island government procurement statute made an oral landscaping contract “null and ineffective.” There, the court (in an opinion by Alito, J.) held that:

... [Plaintiff] may not circumvent this statutory provision by invoking the doctrine of quantum meruit or other related equitable theories ... Interpreting ... [the Virgin Island statute] we held ... that a contract that did not meet statutory requirements was “null and void ab initio” and could not be “enforced on a theory of quantum meruit; substantial compliance or estoppel.” We explained that “if contracts violative of statutory prohibitions may be executed by government agencies and subsequently enforced, the power of the legislature and the process of government itself would be undermined.”

What the Village could not waive by its affirmative act, it certainly could not waive by implication. Therefore, a municipality may neither expressly or implicitly waive a violation of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801.

Plaintiffs Were Not Deprived of a Constitutionally Protected Property Interest in Smallacre.

Because the 2005 Resolution was void ab initio, Plaintiffs acquired no property interest by its adoption. Accordingly, the only property interest that Plaintiffs maintained in Smallacre in 2007 when the new Board of Trustees rescinded the 2005 Resolution and accepted the offer of dedication was the interest that Lexjac acquired from Foreal in 2004. However, that interest was subject to the outstanding irrevocable offer of dedication given by Foreal to the Village in 1972, pursuant to N.Y. Village Law § 7-730(4).

By tendering a deed for Smallacre together with the irrevocable offer of dedication, Foreal invited the Village to accept the offer by recording the deed. In purchasing Smallacre, Lexjac stepped into Foreal’s shoes. The Village was not required to give Lexjac further notice before accepting the tender of its predecessor in interest. In Underhill Ave. Corp. v. Vil. of Croton-on-Hudson, the Second Department held that:

A municipality may accept an offer of dedication at any time prior to a valid revocation by all parties who have a legal interest in the land subject to such offer, including subdivision homeowners who purchase their lots with reference to a subdivision map noting the offer of dedication. A municipality may reject an offer of dedication. Here, however, the Village did not do so. A lapse of time does not extinguish an offer of dedication, which may be accepted at any time prior to a valid revocation by all interested parties ... Further, a failure to accept an offer of dedication is not a rejection of that offer ... Finally, the open offer of dedication noted on the subdivision plat remains enforceable against subsequent purchasers, regardless of the fact that the Village previously purported to convey Lot 14 without noting the open offer of dedication on the deed. Accordingly, the offer of dedication remains open and
the Supreme Court properly awarded summary judgment to the defendants.42

Citations omitted.

Here, because the 2005 Resolution was a nullity, it was not a “valid revocation by all interested parties,” and the Village was free to accept the offer “at any time.” The lapse of time did not extinguish the offer of dedication. The offer of dedication was recorded in the office of the County Clerk and noted on the filed subdivision map and was enforceable against Lexjac as a subsequent purchaser.43

Protected property interests are “created and their dimensions are defined” by state law.44 Here, plaintiffs’ ownership of Smallacre was subject to the irrevocable offer of dedication created pursuant to N.Y. Village Law § 7-730(4) and the Planning Board’s decision granting subdivision approval. The time for challenging the Planning Board decision expired 30 days after the decision was filed with the Village Clerk, in July 1969.45

As was the case with the untenured faculty member in Roth, cited supra, who possessed a property right in his employment that was subject to termination at the unfettered discretion of the Board of Regents, here Lexjac possessed a property right in Smallacre that was subject to termination at the unfettered discretion of the Village by its acceptance of the offer of dedication. Neither the faculty member in Roth nor the Plaintiffs here had any legitimate claim of entitlement beyond the interest created, and limited, by state law.

Cases finding a right to due process that involve non-consensual government interference with possessory interests were inapplicable. For example, in Fuentes v. Shevin46 the Supreme Court held that goods sold under a conditional sales contract could not be repossessed without the intervening act of a default by the debtor. Here, no similar intervening act was required to trigger the Village’s right to accept the offer of dedication.

In Dunbar Corp. v. Lindsey,47 the plaintiff purchased real property after receiving assurance from the government that it had no interest in the subject property. Here, the opposite occurred. Lexjac purchased Smallacre after being informed by the Village Attorney that it remained subject to the outstanding offer of dedication “and the ultimate divesting of all rights, title and interest of the then current owner of the land without compensation at the time the offer is accepted by the Village . . . .” In Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams,48 the Court determined that a mortgagee should have received prior notice of a tax sale, as it would have had a statutory opportunity to redeem the property under the applicable state tax law. By contrast, N.Y. Village Law § 7-730(4) provides no analogous right of redemption. The Village was authorized to accept the consensually given irrevocable offer of dedication and file the tendered deed without further notice to Lexjac, which stood in the shoes of the original offeror.

CONCLUSION

There is no longer any question that an agreement by a municipality to relinquish an interest in real property in favor of a municipal officer or employee having the power or duty to approve the agreement, supported by consideration, is a “contract” within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801. Recusal by the interested officer or employee will not cure the statutory violation.

The interested officer or employee need not know that his agreement with the municipality is a contract in order for the violation to be “willful” and the contract void. The interested officer or employee need only know the facts giving rise to the violation. Neither the actions of the Village in relinquishing the real property interest, nor the passage of time, will constitute a waiver of the statutory prohibition.

A property interest willfully acquired in violation of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 801 is not constitutionally protected, and the interested municipal officer-applicant will not be entitled to procedural due process before the municipality reclaims the property interest.

ENDNOTES:

1Landau v. Percacciolo, 50 N.Y.2d 430, 429

L. 1964, ch. 946, § 1.

See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 802 for contracts that are permitted as exceptions to § 801, notwithstanding that an officer or employee with control over the contract will derive a benefit. In such cases, recusal is required. See, e.g., N.Y. Comp., Op. 2008-2 (2008) (a newly elected town board member should recuse himself from the discussions or decisions relating to a hauling contract between the town and his wholly owned company that met the “grandfather” exception set forth at N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 802(1)(h) because it was entered into prior to the board member’s election to office); 1988 N.Y. St. Comp. 86 (a town board should recuse himself in connection with a contract between the town and his secondary employer that was permitted pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 802(1)(b) even though the town board member derived no remuneration and had no employment duties in connection with the contact).

Village used throughout this article is in reference to the Village of Muttontown.

N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-730(4) authorizes a local municipality, in appropriate cases, to require a subdivision developer to dedicate land to the municipality for park, playground, or other recreational purposes.


See Eastern Oaks Development, LLC v. Town of Clinton, 76 A.D.3d 676, 678, 906 N.Y.S.2d 611 (2d Dep’t 2010).

N.Y. Att’y Gen., Informal Op. 95-2 (1995); see Cahn v. Planning Bd. of Town of Gardiner, 157 A.D.2d 252, 258, 557 N.Y.S.2d 488 (3d Dep’t 1990) (Planning Board members “not only immediately disclosed their interests, but of critical importance, they abstained from any discussion or voting regarding the subdivisions.”).

E. Oaks Dev., LLC, 76 A.D.3d at 678.


See Eastern Oaks Development, LLC v. Town of Clinton, 76 A.D.3d 676, 678, 906 N.Y.S.2d 611 (2d Dep’t 2010).


42 *Id.* at 965 (internal citations omitted).

43 *See O’Mara v. Town of Wappinger*, 9 N.Y.3d 303, 309, 849 N.Y.S.2d 9, 879 N.E.2d 148 (2007) (an open space restriction shown on a final plat, when filed in the Office of the County Clerk, is enforceable against a subsequent purchaser).


47 *Dunbar Corp. v. Lindsey*, 905 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1990).


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